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“RUNAWAY TRAIN”1: CONTROLLING CRIMES COMMITTED BY 
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE 
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE  
Matthew Dahl*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Cold War, contract employees have played an increasingly essential 
role in the deployment of U.S. armed forces.  Civilians accompanying armed forces 
overseas provide a wide range of services to the military in areas ranging from 
weapons system operations, to communications, to stevedoring.2  Operations 
Desert Storm and Desert Shield ushered in the recent trend of using contractors as a 
major component of the armed forces when they deploy.3  Since the first Gulf War 
these civilian contractors4 have performed services for the United States in military 
deployments in Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait, Rwanda, and the Balkans.5
There are approximately 154,000 contractors operating in Iraq,6 and the U.S. 
government spends billions of dollars every year paying them for their services.7
The unprecedented need for contractors began in Iraq because the plan for the in-
vasion, created by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, wanted to use as 
lean an invasion force as possible.8  Conventional wisdom from past and present 
 ________________________  
! Matthew Dahl is a 2009 graduate of the University of Richmond School of Law.  He would like to 
thank Professor John Paul Jones for his ideas and edits with regard to this paper. 
     1.  This is a variation on the title of Elvis Presley’s song “Mystery Train” which plays on a video of securi-
ty contractors firing on civilian vehicles in Iraq.  The video is available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5z0NMKcVHHM. 
 2. OVERSEAS JURISDICTION ADVISORY COMM., § 1151 Pub. L. No. 104-106, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL  LAW JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES IN TIME OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 16-17 (1997) [hereinafter “OJAC REPORT”].
 3. 4,500 Department of Defense civilian employees and 3,000 contractors deployed with the armed forces 
during Desert Storm and Desert Shield.  Id. at 15-16. 
 4. This paper will focus on applying court-martial jurisdiction to private contractors that accompany U.S. 
forces in the field.  The private contractors referred to in this paper are U.S. citizens.  There are contractors ac-
companying U.S. forces that are not U.S. citizens, which raises even more jurisdictional questions, but those 
contractors are not the focus of this paper.  It is also important to note that the recommendations made in this paper 
can also be applied to civilian employees of the U.S. government who accompany U.S. forces overseas. 
 5. Id. at 16.  The combined number of civilians accompanying the military to these conflicts was 2,906.  
Id.
 6. Ben Davidson, Liability on the Battlefield: Adjudicating Torts Suits Brought by Soldiers Against Mili-
tary Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 807 (2008). 
 7. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO. 07-145, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, HIGH-
LEVEL DOD ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS WITH MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF 
CONTRACTORS SUPPORTING DEPLOYED FORCES 1 (2006). 
 8. Donald Rumsfeld imagined a total invasion force much closer to 100,000 troops while some military 
leaders were insisting that several hundred thousand would be needed.  Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: 
Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size, NY TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, 
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military commanders was that a force, anywhere from 385,0009 to 500,00010
troops, was needed to invade and secure Iraq; however, Rumsfeld envisioned a 
force of no more than 125,000 troops.11  In the end, the U.S. invaded Iraq with just 
over 150,000 troops.12  Because of the significant reduction in troop numbers, the 
United States created a situation in which it needed more manpower to carry out its 
mission.  The United States filled this vacuum with private contractors. 
A significant number of the total contractor force was comprised of private se-
curity contractors.13  Private security contractors provided a wide array of contract-
ing services ranging from logistics support to direct tactical and combat support.14
As of 2007, there were approximately 30,000 security contractors operating in Iraq, 
and the U.S. government planned to spend $1.5 billion in outsourcing its security 
operations within the next year.15  These security contractors caused major legal 
concerns.  There are numerous reports by Iraqi citizens, and contractors them-
selves, saying that security contractors are indiscriminate with how they use force 
and frequently use it against innocent bystanders.16  Despite what would usually be 
considered serious criminal violations, there was no legal action taken against the 
contractors involved in the abuses of prisoners in Abu Ghraib or against the con-
tractors employed by Blackwater USA, who killed 17 and wounded 24 individuals, 
when they opened fire on innocent Iraqis at Nisoor Square in Baghdad.17
Recent reports say that the number of contractors in Afghanistan will increase 
dramatically along with the surge in troops.18 While the contractors’ services are 
considered vital to the mission of U.S. armed forces, a serious jurisdictional gap 
exists which makes it extremely difficult to hold them accountable for crimes they 
commit while overseas.  In 2006, Congress took an important step towards holding 
contractors accountable with section 552 of the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.  This legislation amended Article 2(a)(10) 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) granting military jurisdiction 
over civilians accompanying armed forces during a “contingency operation” – es-
 ________________________  
 9. This is the number General Tommy Franks first approached Rumsfeld with in 2001 when Rumsfeld 
first called for an invasion plan with reduced troop numbers.  MICHAEL R. GORDON & GENERAL BERNARD E.
TRAINOR, Cobra II 28 (Pantheon Books 2006).  
 10. This is the number laid out in U.S. Central Command’s OPLAN 1003-98 before Rumsfeld asked for 
the number to be significantly reduced.  Id. at 4.  
 11. This is the number of troops Rumsfeld felt should be the maximum needed after he was presented with 
OPLAN 1003-98.  Id.
 12. Id. at Appendix. 
 13. In 2008 there were 30,000 private security contractors operating in Iraq.  Jennifer K. Elsea, et al., 
Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, Aug. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf. 
 14. E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0?  The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and its Implications 
for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 225 (2008). 
 15. Steve Fainaru, Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War, WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 2007, at 
A1. 
 16. Human Rights First, Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity 5-8 (2008), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 15-21. 
 18. Walter Pincus, Up to 56,000 More Contractors Likely for Afghanistan, Congressional Agency Says,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121504850.html. 
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sentially allowing the military to court-martial civilians deployed with U.S. mili-
tary forces.  In the absence of other effective methods, the new amendment to Ar-
ticle 2(a)(10) is vital to controlling contractors accompanying U.S. armed forces 
because it provides a workable and efficient avenue through which most crimes by 
contractors can be prosecuted.  Despite its utility, the amendment to Article 
2(a)(10) raises very serious constitutional questions, and a significant prosecution 
under this new law will likely result in a challenge that will reach the Supreme 
Court.  
This paper will argue that, in the absence of effective alternatives, the new law 
granting court-martial jurisdiction over civilians is a necessary step in effectively 
controlling crimes by private contractors and other civilians accompanying U.S. 
armed forces overseas if other measures are not effectuated.  Part II will look at 
two important Supreme Court decisions that currently restrict the military’s ability 
to court-martial civilians, and it will also highlight the government’s attempts over 
the past 50 years to come up with a solution to the problem.  Part III will examine 
three alternatives to the   amendment to Article 2(a)(10) that could make the 
amendment unnecessary if they are effectively implemented.  Part IV examines the 
new Article 2(a)(10), highlights the constitutional concerns it raises, and will show 
that these concerns can be overcome.  Part V briefly discusses Supreme Court 
precedent that could allow court-martialing of civilians to be a constitutional alter-
native to the civilian criminal process.  The paper will conclude that, if other effec-
tive measures are not implemented, the amendment to Article 2(a)(10) is necessary 
to control contractor crime, and that the Supreme Court should uphold the new law 
if a future challenge arises.    
II. THE COURT’S DECISIONS IN REID AND AVERETTE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT 
PUSH FOR LEGISLATION TO CONTROL CRIMES COMMITTED BY CIVILIANS 
ACCOMPANYING ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS.
A. Reid v. Covert and United States v. Averette
Attempts to control crimes committed by civilians accompanying armed forces 
overseas has been a problem since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Reid v. Co-
vert19 and United States v. Averette.20  The Reid case involved an appeal by two 
wives of active duty servicemen that were found guilty, in court-martial proceed-
ings, of killing their husbands.21  Both appealed the convictions arguing that court-
martialing civilians was unconstitutional.22
The Court in Reid found that the military court-martial system did not effec-
tively protect the right to a trial by jury promised to civilians in Article III section 2 
and the Sixth Amendment, and it also abridged the Fifth Amendment right to a 
 ________________________  
 19. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 20. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970). 
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grand jury.23  It also analyzed Article I section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution, 
which gives Congress the ability to make rules for regulation of the land and naval 
forces.24 The Court reasoned that the “land and naval forces” referred only to 
members of the armed services and not civilians accompanying armed forces.25
The government relied on the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause to show 
that Congress could subject civilians to military law, but the Court countered by 
saying that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not trump the guarantees given 
to civilians by the Bill of Rights.26  The opinion recognized that lower federal 
courts had upheld civilian courts-martial before, but that those courts-martial were 
conducted under the government’s “war powers” that arise during a time of active 
hostility.27 Because the wives’ cases happened during peace-time that congres-
sional authority did not exist; therefore, both of the courts-martial were struck 
down as unconstitutional.28
Thirteen years after Reid, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals decided the case 
of United States v. Averette. Averette arose during the Vietnam War when a civi-
lian employee of the Army was caught stealing 36,000 batteries from the U.S. gov-
ernment.  He was convicted by court-martial and appealed.29  In a short opinion, 
the U.S. Court of Military Appeals adopted a strict construction of the phrase “in 
time of war” finding that the phrase referred only to a congressionally declared 
war.30  Since the Vietnamese conflict was not a congressionally declared war, Ave-
rette’s trial by court-martial was declared unconstitutional. 
While the court’s decision struck down the court-martial, the Averette opinion 
did make an interesting comment regarding the courts-martial of civilians, saying 
that Congress could use its legislative power to allow civilian courts-martial if it 
amended the Article 2(a)(10).31  While the opinion left this possibility open, it also 
offered a caveat by saying that it did not presume the constitutionality of civilian 
courts-martial should Congress decide to pass the legislation.32
Taking Reid and Averette together, the real questions become: 1) if Congress 
changes Article 2(a)(10) to allow for civilian courts-martial during a time of some-
thing other than a congressionally declared war, will such a court-martial still be 
constitutional?; and 2) will the Court strike down any law permitting civilian 
courts-martial because it would automatically violate the rights that concerned the 
Court in Reid?  The new Article 2(a)(10) should provide a vehicle through which 
these questions could be answered. 
 ________________________  
 23. Id. at 5-10. 
 24. Id. at 19-20. 
 25. Id.
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. Id. at 33. 
 28. Id. at 34. 
 29. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 363. 
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B.  The 1979 GAO Report on Crimes by U.S. Civilian Personnel Overseas 
After the decisions in Reid and Averette, crimes by civilians accompanying 
armed forces overseas became such a concern that it prompted the United States 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) to issue a report in 1979 detailing the dangers 
of the restricted jurisdiction over these civilians.  The GAO reported that a series of 
Supreme Court cases from 1957 to 1960 eviscerated the United States’ ability to 
prosecute crimes committed by civilian employees overseas.33  It reported further 
that, from 1960 to 1979, the United States sent 343,000 civilian personnel and de-
pendents overseas, but had no power to prosecute crimes committed by these 
people.34
The Vietnam War is an excellent example of the inability of the United States 
to prosecute overseas crimes by U.S. civilian personnel.  At the peak of the U.S. 
buildup in Vietnam, it is estimated that there were over 10,000 civilian government 
personnel and contractors present in the country.35  Due to an unclear agreement 
between the U.S. and Vietnam36 the question as to jurisdiction over criminal ac-
tions by civilian personnel became a major concern.37  Even though the agreement 
was unclear, U.S. military forces still had the option of court-martialing civilians 
that committed crimes in Vietnam.  That option ended in 1970 when the Averette
opinion was handed down.  Since Vietnam was not a congressionally declared war, 
courts-martial of civilian personnel were no longer possible.38  Instead, the U.S. 
military was forced to adopt administrative sanctions (debarment), which merely 
removed an offending civilian’s military privileges, 39 taking away the civilian’s 
ability to be employed in Vietnam.40
The GAO report concluded that all criminal offenses, petty and serious, com-
mitted by U.S. civilian personnel overseas should be subjected to prosecution by 
U.S. authorities.  It recommended that Congress pass legislation allowing the pros-
ecution of these civilians, and that the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and De-
partment of Justice (“DoJ”) begin preparing procedures by which they could han-
dle these potential prosecutions.41
 ________________________  
 33. SOME CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED OVERSEAS BY DOD CIVILIANS ARE NOT BEING PROSECUTED:
LEGISLATION IS NEEDED, GAO Report No. FPCD 79-45 at 6 (1979), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/110369.pdf [hereinafter “GAO Report”] (citing Reid, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); and Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)). 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. George S. Prugh, Law at War: Vietnam 1964-1973 88 (Dep’t of the Army, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office) 
(1975), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/rfd/Military_Law/law-at-war/pdf. 
 36. This agreement was known as the “Pentalateral Agreement”, and it controlled the legal rights of U.S. 
personnel in Indochina between the U.S., France, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  Id. at 87. 
 37. Id. at 92. 
 38. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365-66. 
 39. Prugh, supra note 35, at 110.  By 1971, just one year after the Averette decision, the U.S. military 
debarred 943 U.S. civilians.  Id.  This means that 943 U.S. civilians committed crimes in Vietnam for which the 
only consequence was losing their job and getting sent back to the United States.  Id.
 40. By 1971, just one year after the Averette decision, the U.S. military debarred 943 U.S. civilians.  This 
means that 943 U.S. civilians committed crimes in Vietnam for which the only consequence was losing their job 
and getting sent back to the United States.  Id.
 41. GAO Report, supra note 33, at 19. 
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C. The Report of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee 
After the 1979 GAO Report, Congress attempted to cure the jurisdictional gap, 
but the proposed legislation never garnered enough support to become law.42
However, with the Vietnam War over, the issue of what to do with U.S. civilian 
personnel deployed overseas faded into the background because there were no con-
flicts which required their services.43  The end of the Cold War marked the latest 
uptick in using civilians as a significant part of deployed armed forces. 44  Because 
worldwide military activity decreased during the Cold War, an abundance of for-
mer military operators chose to enter the contracting business and sell their services 
to governments that needed them.45
For the United States, the First Gulf War saw the reemergence of utilizing civi-
lian personnel to supplement deployed military forces.46  This group of civilians 
consisted of government civilian employees and a new contingent composed of 
private contractors.  The U.S. used 4,500 DoD civilian employees along with 3,000 
private contractors during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.47  Following 
the First Gulf War, the U.S. would use over 3,000 government civilian and private 
contract employees in the conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait, Rwanda, and the 
Balkans.48  With the significant use of civilian personnel in those conflicts, the 
question of the legal status of civilians deployed with U.S. armed forces became a 
concern again.49  In 1996, Congress created the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory 
Committee (“OJAC”) to take another look at this problem.
The OJAC considered options for applying criminal laws to the actions of civi-
lians accompanying U.S. armed forces outside of the United States as a way to 
bridge the jurisdictional gap.50  It compiled a major report for Congress that ana-
lyzed the increasing use of civilians in armed conflicts and concluded that legisla-
tion was needed to control criminal activity by civilian personnel operating with 
U.S. armed forces.  The conclusions of the OJAC would create the basis for the 
new amendment to Article 2(a)(10) that granted court-martial jurisdiction over 
civilians accompanying an armed force in a contingency operation.51
 ________________________  
 42. Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem,
148 MIL. L. REV. 114 n.2 (1995). 
 43. The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada and the 1988 U.S. invasion of Panama were the most significant 
U.S. military actions between 1979 and 1991, but there is no evidence to show that U.S. civilian personnel played 
a significant role during these two conflicts.  
 44. William R. Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 
671-72 (2006). 
 45. Id. at 672. 
 46. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
 47. Id. at 16 (citing DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS N-2-3 (1992)), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/404.pdf. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id. at 16-21. 
 50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 1151, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 
(1996).  See Transmittal Letter from Judith A. Miller of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee to Albert 
Gore (June 21, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Miller Letter”].
 51. See Miller Letter, supra note 49. 
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The OJAC recognized two existing gaps in jurisdiction over government civi-
lian employees and contractors that accompanied armed forces overseas.  The first 
gap was the lack of court-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians 
accompanying a U.S. armed force.  The OJAC report stated it was imperative that 
the military be able to enforce the UCMJ over civilians because of the increasing 
integration of civilians into military operations.52  The second gap involved the 
jurisdiction of Article III civilian courts here in the U.S.  The OJAC recommended 
that felonies committed by civilians, accompanied by an armed force in a foreign 
country, be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts.53  The first recommen-
dation created the basis for the new law granting court-martial jurisdiction over 
civilians, while the second created the basis for Military Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion Act (“MEJA”).  The OJAC explicitly stated that these recommendations were 
independent of each other and that each should be implemented to completely fill 
the jurisdictional gaps.54
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CONTROLLING CONTRACTOR CRIME 
WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE NEW ARTICLE 2(A)(10) 
There are several methods through which contractors could be held accounta-
ble for crimes they commit while accompanying an armed force overseas.  This 
section will lay out two alternatives to the new Article 2(a)(10).  First, it will ex-
plore the possibility of using contracts to clear up the constitutional problems 
caused by court-martialing contractors on the front end.  Second, the section will 
look at the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and whether it is an effective 
alternative to civilian court-martial.   
A.  Contractual Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
Making contractors waive their normal constitutional trial rights when they 
sign their employment contracts could be a clean and effective way to avoid the 
constitutional issues discussed in this paper.  A contract provision, acting as a 
waiver of constitutional rights, would need to explicitly lay out that if the contrac-
tor broke a criminal law while accompanying an armed force in the field that per-
son would be subject to a military court-martial rather than a civilian criminal trial.  
The contract provision would also need language stating specific constitutional 
rights and how they could be affected.  This idea seems like it could be an easy end 
run around the constitutional issues, but it has its own difficulties and uncertainties. 
Waiving constitutional rights by contract is not a new idea.  Waivers are com-
mon components of contracts in the business world where they usually affect the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.55  The waivers that cause the most con-
 ________________________  
 52. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at iv-v. 
 53. Id. at v-vi. 
 54. Id. at vi. 
 55. Wayne Klomp, Harmonizing the Law in Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Jury Waiver Provisions in 
Contracts, 6 NEV. L.J. 545, 545 (2005-2006). 
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cern are called “pre-dispute” waivers.56 “Pre-dispute” waivers in contracts take 
effect before a dispute arises and come in two forms: explicit and implicit.57  The 
language in explicit waivers directly states that the party signing the contract agrees 
not to exercise a specific constitutional right.58   In the case of government contrac-
tors waiving their civilian trial rights in favor of those granted under military court-
martial, the waiver would need to be explicit.59
The need for explicit waivers comes from the fact that courts are hesitant to en-
force these types of waivers unless they are “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” 
especially in the area of fundamental rights.60  This standard for a waiver of consti-
tutional rights in the criminal context was recognized in Brady v. United States.61
While Brady did not elucidate what makes up a “voluntary, knowing, and intelli-
gent” waiver, scholars have enumerated several factors which courts use in making 
the determination: 1) negotiability of the waiver; 2) conspicuousness of the waiver; 
3) disparity of the bargaining power between the parties; and 4) the experience and 
sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.62
The Supreme Court upheld a “pre-dispute” waiver in the case of D.H. Over-
myer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co.63  In Overmyer, the Court reiterated its support for 
the “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” standard, but found that the circums-
tances surrounding the waiver are very important in any waiver analysis.64  The 
facts that the Court seemed to find most important were those relating to the bar-
gaining power between the parties.65  In Overmyer, the Court found the waiver to 
be valid because the party that opposed the waiver was a sophisticated business 
that should have understood the gravity of the waiver it signed.66  The Court stuck 
by its decision in Overmyer in the later case of Fuentes v. Shevin when it over-
turned waivers of constitutional rights signed by unsophisticated, laymen purchas-
ers because the contracts containing the waivers amounted to contracts of adhesion 
and did not clearly state the rights that the purchasers were giving up.67
The Overmyer and Fuentes cases both deal with rights in the civil realm rather 
than the criminal one, but they are used only to illustrate what the Supreme Court 
finds to be important in analyzing waivers of constitutional rights and the “volunta-
 ________________________  
 56. Id. at 546-47.  There are also “post-dispute” waivers, but their application is governed by Rules 38-39 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id.  The application of post-dispute waivers is almost universally en-
forced under the “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” standard.  Id. at 550. 
 57. Id. at 548. 
 58. Id. at 547.  Implicit waivers make no such direct statement and, in the realm of commercial contracts,  
come in the form of arbitration clauses.  Id. at 548. 
 59. Id. at 548.  Implicit waivers make no such direct statement and, in the realm of commercial contracts, 
come in the form of arbitration clauses.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 550. 
 61. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 62. Klomp, supra note 55, at 550 (citing Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due 
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. Rev. 1, 57-58 (1997)). 
 63. D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). 
 64. Id. at 187-88. 
 65. Id. at 188. 
 66. Id. at 186. 
 67. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1983). 
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ry, knowing, and intelligent” standard.  The Court did adopt the “voluntary, know-
ing, and intelligent” standard as to criminal trial rights in Brady, but the situations 
facing courts with regards to waiver in the criminal context have been different 
than those in Overmyer and Fuentes.  The discussion on a waiver of constitutional 
rights in the criminal area is based around plea bargains acting as waivers.68  The 
Court has found that criminals can use plea bargains to waive certain Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendment rights.69  The logic behind this is that the criminal is free to 
give up these rights in order to get beneficial treatment from the government.70
While the Supreme Court upheld a person’s right to waive constitutional rights 
in the criminal sphere in plea bargain situations, it is unclear whether they will al-
low waiver of these rights by contract before an alleged crime is ever committed.  
The waivers I propose would be equivalent to the “pre-dispute” waivers mentioned 
above because they would force a contractor to sign away his civilian trial rights, 
for those of the court-martial system, before he ever began work as a contractor 
accompanying an armed force.  This differs from plea bargain waivers because 
when a defendant is plea bargaining he is admitting that he committed a crime, 
whereas a contractor signing a “pre-dispute” waiver would be waiving his criminal 
trial rights before he ever committed a crime.  While “pre-dispute” waivers, as long 
as they are “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” are allowed in the context of civil 
trial rights, a court may find that such a waiver is not permissible as to criminal 
rights because the gravity of criminal trial rights is greater than that of civil trial 
rights. 
B. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
Congress passed the MEJA in 2000, which granted jurisdiction over acts com-
mitted outside of the United States that would have constituted criminal felonies if 
committed inside the U.S.71  The MEJA allowed for crimes committed by contrac-
tors accompanying an armed force to be investigated by the Department of Justice 
and tried in a federal court in the United States.72  Thus far, the MEJA suffers from 
glaring deficiencies and has not been effective.  
Since its passage, there have only been twelve prosecutions carried out under 
the MEJA.73  One problem with the statute is that the government agencies respon-
sible for implementing it have not coordinated an implementation process.74  After 
the MEJA’s passage, the DoD, the DoJ, the Department of State, and other federal 
 ________________________  
 68. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 832-42 (2003). 
 69. Id. at 831 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 248 (1973); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1938)). 
 70. Id. at 832-33 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978)). 
 71. No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators in the United States: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Rights and Law, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter “Mandelker Testimony”] (statement of 
Sigal P. Mandelker, Duputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Criminal Division Department of Justice), available at 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/MandelkerTestimony080409a.pdf. 
 72. Id. at 2-3. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. David A. Melson, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractors: A Historical Overview, 52 NAVAL
L. REV. 277, 316-17 (2005). 
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agencies were supposed to coordinate a plan for implementing the MEJA, but they 
never did.75  Given the lack of guidance as to how and when to apply the MEJA, it 
is practically a dead letter law today.76
Another factor adding to the MEJA’s ineffectiveness are the practical/logistical 
difficulties associated with the prosecutions of overseas contractor crime.  The 
OJAC recognized that the major practical problem from a law like the MEJA 
would be that victims, witnesses, and other evidence will be at the site of the crime, 
which will most likely be thousands of miles away.77  Getting all the evidence to a 
U.S. federal court would prove to be extremely burdensome or impossible in many 
cases.  
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Robert E. 
Reed, a DoD attorney, confirmed the OJAC’s fears concerning the practic-
al/logistical problems.78 Under the MEJA, it is up to the individual U.S. Attorney’s 
office that is assigned the case, to prosecute the case.  In the case of a prosecution 
in Iraq, this would mean traveling thousands of miles to Iraq on multiple occasions, 
attempting to gather information in a warzone and attempting to get whatever evi-
dence they can find into a court in the U.S.79  In addition, it is up to the individual 
office to fund the prosecution out of its own budget.80  Such a prosecution could 
conceivably sap the entire annual budget of a single U.S. Attorney’s office.
As noted above, the MEJA was contemplated as one of a set of laws that the 
U.S. could rely on to control crimes by contractors, but it was not meant to stand 
alone.  In theory, the MEJA could stand alone as the way by which contractor 
crime could be controlled.  Given enough resources it is conceivable that federal 
prosecutors in the U.S. could prosecute these cases, but thus far the federal gov-
ernment seems to lack the will to make the MEJA effective.  If the government is 
unwilling to throw its full support behind the MEJA it must be supplemented by 
the new Article 2(a)(10) to allow for more practical and efficient prosecution of 
contractor crimes. 
IV. THE AMENDMENT TO UCMJ ARTICLE 2(A)(10) 
On October 17, 2006, Congress changed the statutory framework of the law 
surrounding the military’s ability to hold contractors accountable via military 
 ________________________  
 75. Closing Legal Loopholes: Justice for Americans Sexually Assaulted in Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) [hereinafter “Reed Testimony”] (statement of 
Robert E. Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel for Military Justice and Personnel Policy Department of 
Defense), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/ReedTestimony080409a.pdf.  
 76. Proposals to Reform the Military Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (statement of Eugene R. Fidell, President of the 
National Institute of Military Justice and Senior Research Scholar in Law and Florence Rogatz Lecturer in Law, 
Yale Law School), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/HEARINGS/PDF/FIDELL090730.PDF.  
 77. Id.
 78. Reed Testimony, supra note 75, at 2. 
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court-martial.81  Buried deep in the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 was a provision that changed the words “time of war” in 
UCMJ Article 2(a)(10) to “declared war or contingency operations.”82  The term 
contingency operation was added in order to cover instances, like the operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. military was engaging in armed conflict out-
side of an official declaration of war.83  This seemingly significant change was 
passed with little fanfare.  Senators Lindsey Graham and John Kerry co-sponsored 
the amendment and added it to the Defense Authorization Act as a floor amend-
ment that was quickly and unanimously passed without any recorded debate.84
With the passage of this law, the vision of the OJAC ten years earlier was finally 
realized, and the military now had the authority to effectively control civilian con-
tractors operating with its units. 
Since its passage there has been some clarification as to how and under what 
circumstances the new law will be used.  A DoD memo sent out on March 10, 2008 
stated that the first step in any prosecution under the new Article 2(a)(10) amend-
ment is to alert the DoJ.85  Once the military notifies the DoJ of the impending 
prosecution the DoJ decides whether it will take the case or not, but during this 
time the military continues its investigation.86  The DoJ has 14 days to notify the 
DoD whether it intends to pursue prosecution or whether it needs more time to 
decide.87  If the DoJ decides to pursue prosecution then the military must end its 
investigation and turn it over to the DoJ to commence the prosecutorial process.88
If the DoJ does not respond within the 14 days or responds and says it will not pur-
sue prosecution, then the military can commence prosecution under the new UCMJ 
Article 2(a)(10).89
 ________________________  
 81. Kara M. Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)Constitutional Gun?: Constitutional Questions in the Application 
of the UCMJ to Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 179, 180 (2008). 
 82. Id.
 83. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.  A major concern of the OJAC was that Article 2(a)(10), as it 
existed, only allowed for court martial jurisdiction in a time of war.  The “in time of war” language was proble-
matic because the United States has not officially declared a war since World War II, and Averette limited the 
phrase only to congressionally declared wars.  In order to remedy this legal deficiency the OJAC recommended 
that Article 2(a)(10) be revised to include “contingency operations.”  The concept of a “contingency operation” is 
not new, but the OJAC wanted to redefine it in to mean a military operation in which there is combat or the threat 
of combat.  The committee wanted the definition of “contingency operation” to be narrow.  The OJAC sought to 
confine the reach of a contingency operation by requiring that the operation be one designated by the Secretary of 
Defense so that there would be a bright line rule in which the term only covered those operations in which offenses 
by civilians would have a substantial impact on operational success.  Id.
 84. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:6:./temp/~c109rHuFRf. 
 85. Memorandum from Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments 
(UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD, Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With 
or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations 2008), avail-
able at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/sec080310ucmj.pdf.  
 86. Id.
 87. Id. at Attachment 3. 
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A. Constitutional Hurdles for the Newly Amended UCMJ Article 2(a)(10)  
The new Article 2(a)(10) provides an important and necessary tool in holding 
contractors accountable for their crimes.  However, the new law does not come 
without its problems.  It is questionable whether Congress can pass a law that sub-
jects contractors to power of a military court.  The sections below will outline the 
potential constitutional challenges that face the new Article 2(a)(10).  
1.  Article I, § 8, clause 14 and the “Necessary and Proper Clause”
In Reid, the government argued that Congress had the power to create laws that 
subjected civilians to court-martial jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article I, 
section 8, clause 14 in conjunction with the “Necessary and Proper Clause.”90  Ar-
ticle I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution allows Congress “[t]o make rules for 
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”91  Article I, section 8 
also contains the “Necessary and Proper Clause” which allows Congress to carry 
out its authority in any way it chooses as long as that action does not violate the 
Constitution.92  The argument was that these two clauses taken together gave Con-
gress power to subject all persons to court-martial jurisdiction if it was necessary to 
regulate the military.93
The Court shot down this argument saying that Congress cannot use the “Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause” to extend court-martial jurisdiction to include civilians 
because such an extension is not allowed by the language of Article I, section 8, 
clause 14.  The Court interpreted “land and naval forces” to include only members 
of the armed services.  Even though the Court rejected this argument when it de-
cided Reid, the door is still open for a court to now find this argument persuasive. 
The controversies in Reid were based around the crimes of family members of 
active duty servicemen and not contractors.94 The Court specifically said that “land 
and naval forces” cannot extend to “civilian wives, children and other depen-
dents”;95 however, the Court then said there might be circumstances where some-
one who is not an active duty military member could be considered part of the 
“land and naval forces.”96  Now that contractors are such a significant portion of 
deployed military forces, a much stronger argument can be made that they consti-
tute part of the “land and naval forces.”  The only connection between the military 
and the two wives in Reid was that they were married to members of the military.  
They did not perform any sort of service for the military or participate in the mili-
tary’s activities in any direct way.  
 ________________________  
 90. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17-23. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 14. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
241 (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2006). 
 93. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-20. 
 94. Id. at 4.
 95. Id. at 19-20. 
 96. Id. at 23. 
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The case is not the same with contractors accompanying the military into the 
field.  Most prominently, and most controversially, private security contractors 
now serve a variety of functions which allow them to engage human targets with 
weapons at their discretion.  It is the case of the private security contractor where 
the “land and naval forces” exception in Reid most likely applies.  The activities 
that security contractors engage in blur the line between civilian and soldier to the 
point where distinguishing between the two can be nearly impossible.  It could be 
harder to make the case that the contractor who provides logistical or transportation 
support falls within the exception in Reid.  However, although the logistical and 
transportation based contractors do not engage in actions like security contractors, 
they still provide a service that would traditionally be performed by military per-
sonnel, but for the outsourcing by contract.     
2. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Concerns 
There are two major Bill of Rights concerns with respect to the new Article 
2(a)(10).  The Fifth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right to an indict-
ment by a grand jury.97  If a contractor were prosecuted through the U.S. civilian 
justice system his case would be sent to a grand jury to determine whether there is 
enough evidence to move forward with the case.  These proceedings are secret, and 
the accused and his attorney are not allowed to be present.   
In contrast, the military justice system does not provide for the right to a civi-
lian grand jury, but does provide for access to an analogous proceeding.98  As op-
posed to secretive civilian grand jury proceedings, the military justice system’s 
grand jury equivalent allows for proceedings in which the accused and his counsel 
may be present, and the accused may cross-examine witnesses.99  This means that 
the military proceeding actually provides an accused person with more rights than a 
civilian grand jury.  Given these expanded rights a court should have little trouble 
in finding that a court-martial provides sufficient Fifth Amendment protection to 
civilian contractors.   
More contrast is found between civilian and military criminal processes when 
the Sixth Amendment is examined.  Two issues exist with respect to the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury.  First, the Manual for Courts-Martial only 
requires that the jury consist of five members.100  The Constitution does not require 
that a jury contain a certain amount of jurors, but the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ballew v. Georgia101 specifically held that a panel of five jurors was insufficient to 
meet the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.102  Furthermore, the military jus-
 ________________________  
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 98. Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the Constitutionality of Subjecting 
Private Civilian Contractors to the Uniform Code of Military Justice During “Contingency Operations”, 86 N.C. 
L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2008).  
 99. Sacilotto, supra note 80; see Article 32 UCMJ; Hamaguchi, supra note 98, at 1055. 
 100. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(a). 
 101. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
 102. Hamaguchi, supra note 98, at 1056. 
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tice system does not require a unanimous verdict for a conviction.103  Again, un-
animity is not a requirement for due process to be met104, but when coupled with 
the military’s lower numerical requirement for jurors, non-unanimous verdicts 
could potentially violate constitutional rights of civilian defendants.105
The other Sixth Amendment concern is the composition of military juries.  
While civilian juries are chosen from diverse civilian populations in the district 
where the trial is to be held, military juries are chosen from active duty members of 
the military.106  Courts-martial do allow for a similar voir dire procedure107, but this 
procedure may not be as effective when jurors are chosen from a more homoge-
nized group than would be found in the civilian world.  Another concern is that 
soldiers may harbor ill will towards civilian contractors leading to military juries 
being more likely to convict a defendant who is a contractor.108
B. Arguments Against Fifth and Sixth Amendment Challenges to the New 
Article 2(a)(10) 
Of these two constitutional hurdles, the Sixth Amendment concerns present a 
greater obstacle than those of the Fifth Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment con-
fers what are considered “fundamental rights.”  Fundamental rights receive a great 
deal of protection from the courts and are rarely susceptible to government in-
fringement.  For this reason, the Sixth Amendment issue as to courts-martial, create 
the biggest threat to the new Article 2(a)(10).109 Furthermore, the Court’s decision 
in Reid v. Covert seemed to be more concerned with Sixth Amendment violations 
than Fifth Amendment violations because courts-martial are less protective of Sixth 
Amendment rights.110
If the new law granting court-martial jurisdiction over contractors is challenged 
under this fundamental rights theory the government will have to show a “compel-
ling interest” for infringing on the Sixth Amendment.111  The government will have 
to convince a court that allowing for courts-martial of contractors is a vital interest 
achieved by the new law.112  In addition to a compelling interest the government 
will have to show that the new law is necessary to achieve its objective, which 
means it must show that it could not obtain its goal through less restrictive 
means.113
 ________________________  
 103. Id. at 1057. 
 104. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972). 
 105. Hamaguchi, supra note 98, at 1057. 
 106. R.C.M. 503(a)(2). 
 107. R.C.M. 912. 
 108. Hamaguchi, supra note 98, at 1058.  Military members may dislike civilian contractors because they 
steal quality soldiers and/or because civilian contractors are slowly encroaching on the missions and responsibili-
ties that have historically belonged to the military. 
 109. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 792. 
 110. Reid, 354 U.S. at 8-9. 
 111. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 797. 
 112. Id.  Interestingly enough the Court did recognize the winning of a war as satisfying the compelling 
interest standard for strict scrutiny.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 113. Id.
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The fundamental rights argument will be an onerous burden to overcome.    
Showing a compelling interest should be the less difficult of the two prongs.  The 
government could try to make the argument that such action is necessary in order 
to win a war.  As has been noted above, crimes by civilian contractors hurt the 
military’s mission and make it substantially more difficult to accomplish, but a 
court may find this too tangential to allow intrusion on a fundamental right.  A bet-
ter argument could be that the compelling interest is in seeing criminals brought to 
justice and many criminal acts committed by contractors have thus far gone unpu-
nished.  Punishment of these criminals is more likely to be achieved through 
courts-martial because of the substantial obstacles facing civilian prosecutions of 
criminals in conflict zones.   
Showing that there is no other reasonable, less intrusive path will be more dif-
ficult because another path already exists in the form of the MEJA statute.  The 
MEJA allows for prosecutions of these same contractors, but allows them to pro-
ceed through civilian prosecuting authorities in civilian courts with all of the nor-
mal constitutional protections.  A counter-argument is that the MEJA has thus far 
been a virtual failure.  Since its passage very few civilian criminals have actually 
been prosecuted, and the U.S. Attorney’s offices responsible for carrying out the 
prosecutions seem reluctant to do so.  Again, this is because of the financial and 
practical difficulties that are posed by prosecutions of crimes that happen in a war 
zone thousands of miles away.  The government could make the argument that the 
only way justice can truly be achieved is by allowing military courts to conduct 
them, and the military is much more able to investigate the crimes and conduct the 
trials than the civilian justice system.  
V. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT WILL ALLOW LEGISLATION THAT 
SUBSTITUTES TRADITIONAL PROCEDURES WITH ALTERNATIVES TO BE 
CONSTITUTIONAL
Alternatives to the traditional civilian criminal procedure protections are not a 
new idea.  Certain situations sometimes require civilians to have their usual protec-
tions modified.  In Ex Parte Milligan, the Court recognized that the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus may be suspended.114  In the recent but related case of Boumediene v. Bush,
the Court considered whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) 
provided sufficient procedural protections for prisoners being held as enemy com-
batants.115   
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court found that the CSRTs of prisoners deemed 
“enemy combatants” did not provide procedural protections that comported with 
the constitution.116  These CSRTs are analogous to the courts-martial allowed by 
the new Article 2(a)(10) because they are military justice procedures used against 
individuals who are not formally connected to the military.  The alleged procedural 
 ________________________  
 114. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 115. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 116. Id. at 2260. 
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deficiencies of the CSRTs included: 1) the fact that the detainee was not allowed to 
have a lawyer assigned to his case; 2) the government’s evidence at the CSRT was 
presumed to be valid; 3) the ability of the detainee to rebut the evidence was ex-
tremely limited; and 4) the appeals process was insufficient to cure these deficien-
cies.117  All of these factors led the Court to determine that the process afforded to 
these detainees failed to meet constitutional minimums.  Although the Court found 
the CSRTs were not a sufficient alternative, it did not find that procedural alterna-
tives would never suffice.   
The Court could consider a court-martial to be a sufficient procedural alterna-
tive because court-martials provide an accused more rights than the CSRTs.  To 
begin, the accused is entitled to counsel.118  Furthermore, court-martial proceedings 
protect the accused against unlawful searches and seizure, compelled self-
incrimination, and allows for discovery of evidence.119  As stated above, the mili-
tary grand jury equivalent lends itself to more protection for an accused than its 
civilian counterpart.  Also, the military appellate process affords greater protection 
on appeal than civilian trials because every case is reviewed de novo, allowing for 
more scrutiny into the actions of the trial court.120  These significant differences 
between a military judicial process the Court found to be unconstitutional (the 
CSRTs) and courts-show that courts-can, and should, be deemed to be a sufficient 
alternative to civilian trials for those civilians that accompany armed forces over-
seas. 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid stated that courts martial for civi-
lians could be a sufficient procedural alternative if the circumstances call for it.  
Harlan only concurred in the result in Reid because it was a capital offense, and he 
felt that the gravity of a capital case did not allow for a civilian’s trial rights to be 
replaced with those of the military.121  Justice Harlan argued that, in other cases, 
military courts-martial could be a sufficient alternative to a civilian trial.  He felt 
that, under changing circumstances, an expansion of military jurisdiction over civi-
lians did not violate the Framers’ intentions of protecting against unchecked mili-
tary power.122  Much of his opinion focused on his belief that civilians serving with 
the U.S. armed forces overseas are not necessarily guaranteed traditional constitu-
tional trial rights.   
In other words . . . there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condi-
tion precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it sub-
ject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and 
considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether 
impracticable and anomalous.123
 ________________________  
 117. Id. at 2281. 
 118. R.C.M. 401(b). 
 119. James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New Millenium, 52 
A.F. L. REV. 185, 204-05 (2002). 
 120. Id. at 210. 
 121. Reid, 354 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 122. Id. at 67-68. 
 123. Id. at 74. 
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Justice Harlan came to the conclusion that grand jury indictment and jury trial 
were not required for the trial of a civilian, and that the conditions of the particular 
circumstance should be weighed in determining whether or not to use court-martial 
jurisdiction over a civilian.124
Another important point that the Court made in Boumediene was that it was not 
absolutely necessary to use an alternative process like the CSRTs because the mili-
tary’s mission would not be compromised by the extra time it would take for the 
detainees at Guantanamo to go through normal habeas corpus proceedings. 125  The 
Court contrasted this with the situation in the case of Johnson v. Eisentrager126
where several German soldiers contested their detention by American forces after 
World War II.127  The Germans in Eisentrager claimed they were actually civilians 
and not soldiers so they brought a suit requesting that a federal district court review 
the conditions of their confinement and discharge them from custody because their 
trial violated the Constitution.128  The Germans lost their suit and the Court said 
that it did not make a difference whether they were soldiers or civilians.129
The Boumediene decision argues that one of the reasons the procedures used in 
Eisentrager were sufficient was that the circumstances surrounding the aftermath 
of WWII created security concerns because the U.S. was responsible for securing 
an area of 57,000 square miles and a population of 18 million.130  Because of this 
monumental task, the Court felt that judicial interference in the Eisentrager situa-
tion would be inappropriate given the efforts of American military commanders to 
effectuate control over the area.131   
The reasoning that the Court uses in Boumediene is directly applicable to the 
situation facing U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  U.S. forces in Iraq actually 
face a greater task than the U.S. forces in Eisentrager because they are responsible 
for the security of a country that covers an area of 169,285 square miles (Iraq) and 
251,825 square miles (Afghanistan) with populations of over 28 million people in 
both countries.132  American military commanders face a daily battle in trying to 
protect U.S. forces from insurgent attacks.  Keeping order amongst both soldiers 
and civilians aiding in this fight is essential.  Allowing crimes by civilians to go 
unpunished undermines the military’s mission and can affect morale among every-
one attempting to restore order in these countries.   
It is true that an important distinction can be drawn between Boumediene and 
Eisentrager and the contractors covered under the new Article 2(a)(10), being that  
those two cases involved non-U.S. citizens.  It can be argued that because of this 
 ________________________  
 124. Id. at 76-78. 
 125. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260. 
 126. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 127. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260. 
 128. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767.  
 129. Id. at 765. 
 130. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 131. Id.
 132. The World Factbook 2009, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html#People.  This site lists Iraq’s land area 
at 437,367 square kilometers, but that number was converted to miles for consistency’s sake. 
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distinction, Boumediene and Eisentrager are irrelevant to the argument concerning 
court-martial of American civilians under Article 2(a)(10).133  While this argument 
cannot be fully fleshed out in this paper, a suggestion is that Boumediene and Ei-
sentrager are useful because they draw attention to the fact that alternative criminal 
procedures are sometimes necessary.  Even though Boumediene struck down the 
argued procedure because it was unconstitutional, it did not say that alternative 
procedures are always unconstitutional.  The CSRTs were unconstitutional because 
they deprived detainees of the most basic rights.  The same is not true of courts-
martial.  We subject those that serve in the military to the court-martial system 
everyday, and do not question its sufficiency as to them even though they are also 
American citizens.  While it is true that the court-martial system is not something 
we want to impose upon American civilians as a matter of course, it is important to 
consider that there may be no other way to serve the ends of justice in certain situa-
tions, like the one now facing us in Iraq. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal is to serve the ends of justice.  Unless the alternatives men-
tioned in this paper, or similar measures, are effectively implemented allowing for 
the courts-martial of contractors, the ends of justice will not be achieved.  There 
has thus far been no indication from the contracting community that they wish to 
include contract provisions that will subject their employees to court-martial juris-
diction.  Without cooperation from the contracting community, that alternative will 
not be realized.  The MEJA is a promising alternative to court-martial jurisdiction 
in theory, but effectively putting it into practice has proven to be a problem.  Rely-
ing on civilian prosecuting authorities to carry out prosecutions of crimes commit-
ted thousands of miles away has resulted in consequences for only a few criminal 
acts.  The fact is that the burden on civilian prosecutors and courts here in the U.S. 
may be too overwhelming to allow for justice to be served via the MEJA statute.  If 
this is true, then requiring the courts-martial of civilians is a necessary step in con-
trolling contractor crime.   
Without a viable alternative, courts-martial of contractors working with U.S. 
armed forces must be permitted because it allows for rapid response to crimes and 
more rapid judicial procedures.  This increased reaction speed also allows for mili-
tary commanders to more effectively control their operational area which helps 
maintain morale amongst those under their command.  Due to the increased effec-
tiveness and efficiency in carrying out justice allowed by the new Article 2(a)(10), 
it should be held to be a constitutionally sufficient procedural alternative to trials in 
civilian court. 
 ________________________  
 133. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768-781. 
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